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Abstract  16 
The Action Plan of the European Commission 2006 – 2010 proposed a move towards 17 
more private and less state regulation of animal welfare and Great British governments 18 
made a commitment to reduce the burden of inspection of farms by targeting high-risk 19 
enterprises. In previous research in GB, farmers in private voluntary regulated schemes 20 
were more compliant with GB legislation and code at statutory welfare inspections made 21 
by the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) than farmers not in such schemes. The 22 
current study investigated whether membership of other private voluntary regulators and 23 
national data sources were associated with greater compliance with welfare at APHA 24 
inspections and whether the previous association between greater compliance and 25 
membership of private schemes persisted.  26 
 27 
Compliance at APHA inspections remained higher on farms in private schemes 28 
previously investigated. It was also higher in the one retailer and seven herd health 29 
schemes investigated. There was no association between non-welfare EU cross 30 
compliance inspections and compliance at APHA inspections. Approximately 90% of 31 
farmers in a scheme passed animal welfare inspections compared with 80% of non-32 
scheme members. We conclude that farms in private schemes are more likely to pass 33 
APHA inspections and so this criterion can be used in selection of farms for risk-based 34 
inspection. We hypothesise that private regulation with regular inspection of all farms 35 
could raise compliance with animal welfare legislation to at least the minimum legal 36 
standards, however, it could result in farms with low welfare being concealed, 37 
consequently, this hypothesis requires testing. 38 
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Introduction 44 
 45 
In the European Union the welfare of farmed animals is regulated by legislation at EU 46 
and region levels (Lundmark et al 2014). In Great Britain, the welfare of farm animals is 47 
legislated by the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (and Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) 48 
Act 2006), supplemented in England, Scotland and Wales by The Welfare of Farmed 49 
Animals Regulations (with amendments) and codes. The Animal and Plant Health 50 
Agency (APHA, formerly AHVLA) carries out animal welfare inspections in GB on 51 
behalf of English, Scottish and Welsh governments and in compliance with the EU, to 52 
investigate compliance with animal legislation and code. Approximately 2000 farms 53 
(1%) are inspected per annum. The reasons for inspection vary and include for example, 54 
targeted inspections (e.g. after stocking a farm), because of a complaint from the public, 55 
where there was a previous non-compliant inspection and random inspections (Table 1). 56 
Those that fail inspections can be prosecuted or given time to rectify an infringement.  57 
 58 
A proportion of farmers (claimants) receive payments from the rural payment schemes in 59 
GB because of compliance with statutory management requirements (SMR) and good 60 
agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC). Payment for these schemes comes 61 
via the EU and since 2007 the EU has required that 1% of claimants under these schemes 62 
are inspected to monitor cross compliance (Defra 2015). Claimants that breach 63 
regulations have reduced payments, and may also be prosecuted.  64 
 65 
In many countries farm animal welfare is partly privately regulated by voluntary schemes 66 
where members have to adhere to standards to retain membership. These are typically 67 
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farm assurance and organic certification schemes, for example: Red Tractor, Neuland, 68 
Global Gap, Ecocert and The Soil Association (Bock & Huik 2007; Lundmark et al 69 
2014). In GB all farms within such a scheme are inspected regularly, typically annually, 70 
and by an independent certification body to ensure that members comply with scheme 71 
standards. Some farms are also in a retailer scheme. The standards are typically not 72 
published and auditing of these schemes is internal to the company.  73 
 74 
The Action Plan of the European Commission 2006 – 2010 has proposed a vision of a 75 
move towards more private and less state regulation of animal welfare (Lundmark et al 76 
2014). In GB, there is evidence that compliance with animal welfare legislation, as 77 
assessed by APHA inspection, was almost two-fold higher on farms regulated by private 78 
assurance schemes or organic certification standards with external auditors and published 79 
standards than farms not known to be in such schemes (KilBride et al 2012).  80 
 81 
The European Commission regulation EC No. 882/2004 states that risk based methods 82 
should be used to determine the frequency of official inspections at a farm. In addition, 83 
GB governments have stated a commitment to reduce the burden on farmers from 84 
government-led inspections (Defra 2014). One method to achieve this is to use risk-based 85 
methods to target a proportion of inspections to farms most at risk of non-compliance, 86 
thus reducing the number of inspections to farmers who are more likely to be compliant. 87 
Membership of a private scheme was added to the risk model from 2012 as a result of 88 
KilBride et al (2012). The outcome of previous APHA welfare inspection and on-farm 89 
cattle mortality (for calf inspections only), calculated from the national database of cattle 90 
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movements, have been included in the algorithm to select farms for risk-based APHA 91 
inspections since 2006. 92 
 93 
Farm assurance and organic schemes only sometimes have a specific focus on animal 94 
welfare, and yet membership of such schemes was associated with greater compliance at 95 
APHA inspections. It is therefore possible that other schemes or sources of data, not 96 
specifically related to welfare, are associated with greater compliance at APHA welfare 97 
inspections and could therefore be included in selection of farms for risk based 98 
inspections (Defra 2011). As a result of a public consultation, Defra initiated research to 99 
investigate whether more private regulators might be associated with compliance with 100 
animal welfare and code at APHA inspections (Defra 2011). After public consultation 101 
and discussion between Defra and researchers at Warwick it was agreed that more 102 
schemes and data sources should be investigated for association with APHA welfare 103 
inspections. Eligible private regulators could include any scheme with published 104 
standards and external audit, retailer schemes or herd health schemes where farmers are 105 
paying for testing to improve animal health. Other national data sources available 106 
included non-welfare related data from the Rural Paying Agencies (Defra 2011) who 107 
inspect for statutory management requirements (SMRs) and good agricultural and 108 
environmental conditions (GAECs) that cover farm and land management compliance. 109 
These could be an indicator of overall conscientiousness (Gambelli et al 2014) of a 110 
farmer and thus also related to compliance with welfare legislation. Data from the Food 111 
Standards Agency on abnormalities in animals recorded in abattoirs could provide a 112 
direct animal-based measure of on-farm welfare. 113 
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 114 
The aims of the current study were therefore to investigate whether other voluntary, 115 
privately regulated schemes and other sources of national data were associated with 116 
increased compliance at AHPA welfare inspections and to investigate whether the greater 117 
compliance with APHA inspections observed with membership of farm assurance and 118 
organic certification schemes persisted from 2008.  119 
 120 
Materials and methods 121 
Ethical approval was granted by the Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics 122 
Committee, University of Warwick (REGO-2014-617). A data sharing agreement was 123 
made with all participating schemes, the paying agencies and Defra. The agreement 124 
covered data confidentiality and security. All data were held at the University of 125 
Warwick, datasets were protected by password authentication and data encryption, and 126 
names, addresses and CPH numbers used to match datasets were replaced with unique 127 
identification codes to anonymise the data before analysis. 128 
 129 
Sources of data 130 
Animal and Plant Health Agency welfare inspections  131 
Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) inspect enterprises to assess compliance with 132 
welfare legislation and code. Reasons for inspection are described in Table 1. For each 133 
enterprise up to 12 areas of inspection (AoI) are made. These are breeding, disease, 134 
environment, equipment, freedom of movement, feed and water, housing, inspections, 135 
mutilations, record keeping, space and staffing. The number of AoI assessed varies by 136 
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reason for inspection; typically all enterprises and all AoI are assessed during cross 137 
compliance risk-based and random inspections. Compliance with animal welfare 138 
legislation and code is scored for each AoI as (A) full compliance with legislation and 139 
code, (B) compliance with legislation but not code, (C) failure to comply with legislation 140 
but no unnecessary suffering seen and (D) unnecessary suffering seen. The worst score 141 
across all AoIs at a visit to an enterprise is used as the overall score for that visit to that 142 
enterprise. Inspections that score A or B are classed as compliant with legislation and C 143 
or D as non-compliant.  144 
 145 
APHA provided inspection records for all animal welfare inspections to enterprises in 146 
England, Scotland and Wales between 2007 and 2013. The data contained the date of 147 
inspection, enterprise type, farm (name, address, and county parish holding (CPH) 148 
number), reason for inspection, number of animals present and inspected and the score 149 
for each AoI inspected.   150 
 151 
Table 1 152 
 153 
Farm assurance, organic certification, herd health and retailer schemes  154 
Known schemes were contacted. These were 10 farm assurance and 6 organic 155 
certification schemes with published standards, 10 retailers thought to have farms in their 156 
buying scheme, 7 herd health and 3 milk recording schemes. There were no eligible herd 157 
health schemes active for pig or poultry enterprises. All schemes, and preferably a named 158 
contact, were contacted by email or telephone. The eligibility criteria for inclusion in the 159 
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study were that they had external standards or activities (e.g. milk quality, testing for 160 
disease) that members actively engaged in which could be associated with good animal 161 
welfare, that all enterprises in the scheme were inspected or tested at least biennially, and 162 
that the scheme was willing to provide a list of all members. After an initial discussion on 163 
the project and eligibility, schemes were contacted at approximately 14-day intervals 164 
until they decided whether to participate.  165 
 166 
Schemes were asked to provide membership records from 2006 – 2013, including: name, 167 
address, postcode, CPH number, joining date, leaving date and any periods of non-168 
continuous certification (e.g. temporary suspension) of members.  169 
 170 
Cross compliance inspections under rural paying agencies 171 
Farmers can claim grants and payments from one of the three rural paying agencies in 172 
England, Scotland or Wales when they comply with various conditions under the basic 173 
payment scheme, stewardship scheme or rural development scheme (Defra 2015). To be 174 
eligible for payment a farmer has to comply with a long list of rules (see the 80+ page 175 
document, Defra 2015). Each year 1% of cross compliance inspections conducted 176 
concern animal management (e.g. animal identification and registration), including the 177 
management of wild animals (Supplementary table 1). Each paying agency provided 178 
inspection records from 2006 to 2013. A list of all claimants’ farm locations from 2007 to 179 
2013 was also supplied.  Breaches are recorded by intent (negligent, intentional), extent 180 
(on or off farm), severity (minimum to very high), permanence (rectifiable, permanent) 181 
and repetition within the previous three years (first offence, second offence etc.). These 182 
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are used by the agencies to calculate any penalty. The data were coded as: inspected and 183 
no breach, inspected and at least one breach or not inspected (no match for farm identity 184 
within one year prior to an APHA inspection). A single measure to capture the most 185 
severe breaches was created, defined as intentional, off-farm, medium to high severity, 186 
permanent, and 2nd occurrence or more.   187 
 188 
All data were available for England. For Scottish and Welsh Governments data, breaches 189 
were recorded but not all non-breaches. It was assumed that when a farm was inspected, 190 
all GAECs were inspected.  191 
 192 
Abnormalities detected at abattoirs  193 
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) provided data on ante- and post-mortem conditions. 194 
No data were available for sheep by farm. Data were available for cattle from July 2012 195 
to July 2013 for the date of slaughter, producer name and CPH number, number of 196 
animals slaughtered, number of each abnormal condition and number of carcasses 197 
rejected. Data were available for pigs from January 2011 to December 2013. The pig data 198 
were by week rather than date of slaughter. Data were available for poultry from July 199 
2010 to December 2013 by week of slaughter, species (broiler, duck, geese, guinea fowl, 200 
hen, quail, rabbit, turkey, and ‘other’), number dead on arrival, number slaughtered, 201 
number with condition, producer name and postcode (and sometimes CPH). There were 202 
443, 218 and 126 possible abnormalities for pigs, cattle, and poultry respectively. 203 
 204 
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Cattle mortality  205 
Records of all cattle movements were obtained from the British Cattle Movement Service 206 
from 2006 to 2013. On-farm cattle mortality was defined as cattle coded as dead whose 207 
last movement was onto a farm. Mortality was calculated per farm per 1000 live cattle 208 
days in the 12 months preceding a welfare inspection. 209 
  210 
Data matching with APHA welfare inspections 211 
Data from all sources were cleaned and screened for errors and inconsistencies to 212 
maximise the information available whilst maintaining accuracy. CPH numbers and 213 
postcodes were normalised to standard formats using automated methods. CPH numbers 214 
were the preferred method of matching between data but where CPH did not result in a 215 
match (or where CPH was missing), postcodes and addresses were used. To avoid 216 
mismatching neighbouring farms with the same postcode, the postcode had to match with 217 
the first line of the farm address within 2 edits. Data were matched at farm level rather 218 
than enterprise level.  219 
 220 
Membership joining and leaving dates were used to determine whether a farm was a 221 
member of a scheme at the time of APHA inspection. Herd health schemes that did not 222 
use joining and leaving dates provided test dates and farms were considered active in a 223 
herd health scheme when a test was within two years before the APHA inspection.  224 
 225 
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Statistical analyses  226 
Data were screened and descriptive analysis was used to summarise the data. Farms were 227 
coded as known to be in a participating scheme or not known to be in that scheme. Where 228 
schemes did not participate all farms were not known to be in the scheme. Schemes were 229 
coded into farm assurance and retailer (F), organic certification (O), and herd health and 230 
milk quality (H) and the number of scheme types (maximum three: F, O and H) that a 231 
farm was known to be a member of at the time of inspection was calculated. The number 232 
of animals inspected within an enterprise was categorised by quintile (Supplementary 233 
table 2). The least frequently inspected enterprises were combined to an ‘other’ category. 234 
 235 
Multivariable multilevel binomial logistic regression models  236 
For each inspection to an enterprise the overall score was coded into a binary outcome 237 
variable of compliant (AB) or non-compliant (CD). This was the outcome variable for all 238 
models. A 4-level mixed effects binomial logistic regression model was used to 239 
investigate associations with compliance with APHA inspection at a visit to an enterprise 240 
from 2007 to 2013 using MLwiN 2.34 (Rasbash et al 2009). The model took the form: 241 
 242 
Logit (pijkl) = β0 + Σβxijkl + Σβxijk + Σβxjk + Σβxk + fl + vlk + uljk  243 
 244 
Where pijkl is the probability of CD at an inspection, β0 is a constant, βx is a vector of 245 
fixed effects varying at level 1 (ijkl), level 2 (jkl), level 3 (kl) or level 4 (l), i is 246 
inspection, j is enterprise, k is farm and l is county, with fl + vlk + uljk being the residuals 247 
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at county, farm and enterprise level respectively. Level 1 variance (ijkl) was constrained 248 
to a binomial distribution. Significance was defined as P ≤ 0.05 using Wald’s statistic.  249 
 250 
Separate models were built for England, Wales and Scotland, claimant and non-claimant 251 
farms, risk-based inspections only and inspections from 2010 to 2013. The model fits 252 
were explored using Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests.  253 
 254 
Results 255 
Descriptive analyses 256 
Records were provided for 55,025 APHA inspections from 2007 - 2013. Missing, 257 
duplicated or unusable values reduced the number of complete records to 54,201 258 
inspections to 32,945 enterprises on 11,800 farms. There were 20,174 (37%), 23,439 259 
(43%), 8,364 (15%) and 2,224 (4%) inspections that scored A, B, C and D respectively. 260 
Of the 32,945 enterprises, 73.8% were inspected once only and 94.6% of one-off 261 
inspections were compliant; this accounted for 42.4% of all inspections. The number and 262 
percentage of inspections by score is presented in Table 2. The proportion of non-263 
compliant inspections by explanatory variables is presented in Supplementary table 3. A 264 
higher percentage of farms in schemes scored A for AoI staffing, inspection of livestock, 265 
disease, records, housing, environment, freedom of movement, breeding (Supplementary 266 
table 4). The visit type to claimants and non-claimants of rural payments varied from 267 
2008 e.g. non-claimants had proportionally fewer random visit types. 268 
 269 
Scheme membership  270 
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Data were provided by 9/10 farm assurance schemes, 5 / 6 organic certification schemes, 271 
5 / 7 herd health schemes, 2 / 3 milk-recording schemes, and 1 / 10 retailer scheme. Data 272 
quality from most of these eligible schemes was good; most were missing a small number 273 
of CPH identifiers and dates when farmers joined the scheme. Discussion with scheme 274 
managers was used to determine whether farms with missing joining dates had been in 275 
the scheme since 2006 or had joined at a later date that was identified by the scheme. 276 
Where this assumption could not be reasonably made farms were considered non-277 
members. Two schemes provided lists of members by calendar year rather than joining 278 
and leaving dates. Three schemes could not provide any dates before 2009 and two could 279 
only provide data from 2011. Almost all farm assurance and organic certification 280 
schemes did not keep, or could not extract, historical records of temporary suspensions. 281 
Of the farms in farm assurance schemes (F), 4.1% were also in organic schemes (O) and 282 
15.1% were in a health scheme (H); whilst 51.0% of O members were in F schemes, and 283 
19.0% were in a H scheme; and 60.7% and 6.1% of H members were also in F and O 284 
schemes respectively.  285 
 286 
Table 2 287 
 288 
Paying agencies cross compliance inspections  289 
The most common reason for non-welfare animal cross compliance inspections were ear 290 
tag identification for cattle and sheep in England, Scotland and Wales, data not shown, 291 
with 15 - 65% inspections coded as a breach in compliance with these SMRs. 292 
 293 
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Abattoir data 294 
There were 15,239 cattle, 10,993 pigs and 7,733 poultry producers in the FSA data. Only 295 
2.5%, 0.9% and 2.5% respectively matched to APHA animal welfare inspection data. The 296 
small number of matches indicated that the data were not representative and so these 297 
were not tested in the model. 298 
 299 
Multivariable model of variables associated with compliance with animal welfare 300 
legislation 301 
In the multivariable model there was a significantly reduced risk of non-compliance if a 302 
farm was a member of any scheme type at the time of inspection compared with farms 303 
not known to be in a scheme (Table 3). Non-claimants had a higher risk of non-304 
compliance compared with claimants. Non-compliance was higher when more animals 305 
were inspected than the smallest quintile of animals. There was an increased risk of non-306 
compliance before 2010, and for risk-based, targeted and complaint visit types (Table 3). 307 
There was no association between non-welfare EU cross compliance inspections and 308 
compliance at APHA inspections. Sub-models did not vary from the main model, with 309 
the exception of loss of power, and are not presented. The model fits were good. After 310 
adjustment for all other variables in the model (Table 3), members of more than one 311 
scheme type had a greater reduced risk of non-compliance (Table 4). 312 
 313 
 314 
Table 3 315 
 316 
16 
 
Table 4 317 
 318 
Discussion  319 
As hypothesised, membership of voluntary, privately regulated schemes other than 320 
quality assurance and organic certification was associated with an increased compliance 321 
with APHA welfare inspections. In addition, farmers in farm assurance (including one 322 
retailer) and organic schemes continued to be more compliant with APHA inspections as 323 
first reported by Kilbride et al (2012). Non-compliance halved from approximately 20% 324 
to 10% of inspections for farms in at least one scheme and, in particular, animal suffering 325 
was recorded at less than 2% of inspections. For farms in several scheme-types 326 
compliance was even greater (Table 4). It is worth noting that the baseline category ‘not 327 
known to be a member of the scheme’ is likely to include some farmers that were scheme 328 
members, both in schemes that participated in the current study and in schemes that did 329 
not participate, consequently, the odds ratios are likely to be even more protective for 330 
scheme members than those presented. These findings are discussed below. 331 
 332 
Our findings suggest that the vision of a move towards more private regulation of animal 333 
welfare (Lundmark et al 2014) is possible, at least in part. One explanation for greater 334 
compliance with APHA inspections for farmers within F and O scheme types is that 335 
farmers already complying with scheme codes become members of such schemes. For 336 
farmers where there is a financial incentive to be in a scheme to gain market access, then 337 
the scheme might be driving farmer behaviour; farmers have referred to such scheme 338 
membership as a ‘necessary evil’ (Hubbard et al 2007). However, many farmers report 339 
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that a commitment to improved welfare and stewardship is their main reason for scheme 340 
membership, particularly schemes with standards that are more rigorous than government 341 
legislation and organic schemes (Bock & Huik 2007; Lundmark et al 2014). Such 342 
farmers might be compliant with government legislation and seek out membership of 343 
private schemes that match their ethos.  344 
 345 
Greater compliance with welfare codes in farms in schemes persisted from the first study 346 
(KilBride et al 2012) to the current analysis. Again, this might be because of market 347 
forces or farmer ethos and management, but it might also be explained by the relatively 348 
short interval between inspections (typically all members are inspected annually for 349 
schemes that participated in the current study) that assist in maintaining welfare 350 
standards. In addition, private schemes included in the current analysis have clear 351 
guidelines for compliance. The recent discussion on whether to change statutory farm 352 
animal welfare codes to industry-led, non-statutory guidance (Defra 2015) so that codes 353 
can be written ‘in a way which [farmers] can relate to’, might lead to clear guidance so 354 
that farmers understand their responsibility for their livestock and implement welfare 355 
codes more easily. This, in turn, might raise compliance at APHA welfare inspections. 356 
 357 
If more compliant farmers choose to be in private schemes then they are a valuable 358 
indicator for risk-based inspection of farms. If there is a causal relationship and all farms 359 
inspected annually raise / maintain animal welfare standards then this raises the 360 
hypothesis that if all farms were provided with clear guidance for compliance and 361 
inspected annually by independent auditors, similar to that required for F and O schemes, 362 
18 
 
compliance at welfare inspections by APHA might be even greater. This hypothesis 363 
would have to be tested, but it might suggest some form of licensing and inspection of all 364 
livestock farms would remove the few farmers that repeatedly fail APHA inspections; 365 
something that many farmers and industry would welcome (Green, personal 366 
communication from sheep farmers). Alternatively, compulsory licensing might drive 367 
farmers to conceal poor welfare, eg by keeping animals they do not want inspected on 368 
land away from the farm if an inspection is planned, and so impact animal welfare 369 
negatively. 370 
 371 
One hypothesis for greater compliance with welfare inspections on farms in herd health 372 
schemes is that these farmers are interested in the control of specific diseases or whole 373 
herd/flock health-planning. Farmers are paying to receive data on e.g. blood tests for 374 
disease prevalence or milk quality tests and so farmers are, presumably, acting on the 375 
results of tests and so raise the standard of animal health (Statham 2011a; Statham 376 
2011b). This is a growing sector in cattle farming, with recent estimates of 14% of cattle 377 
holdings in a herd health scheme (Brigstocke 2012). Neglected disease is one of the AoI 378 
at APHA inspections and farms in herd health schemes were more likely to score A than 379 
C or D in this AoI (Supplementary table 4).  380 
 381 
Membership of multiple scheme types (F, O and H) led to even greater compliance with 382 
welfare legislation. This dose-effect gives weight to the proposal that membership of 383 
schemes can be used to identify farmers likely to be compliant at APHA inspections. 384 
Most schemes with higher than legislation standards require their members to be in basic-385 
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regulation schemes as well, or to show evidence of herd health planning, and it could be 386 
that the analysis is distinguishing this subset of farmers, although APHA inspections only 387 
target compliance with legislation and code and so it cannot be imputed that these 388 
inspections are able to identify schemes with higher welfare standards. It could also be a 389 
reflection of highly compliant farmers that are actively engaging in improving the health 390 
and welfare of their animals through all means available to them. One issue raised in the 391 
introduction was reducing the burden of AHPA inspection through targeted risk-based 392 
inspection. It is important that farms are not receiving several inspections from other 393 
agencies in order to reduce the risk of an APHA inspection. Membership of F and O 394 
scheme types does not necessarily indicate more inspections. The auditors are trained to 395 
assess both F and O compliance at one inspection.  396 
 397 
Farmers in the one retailer scheme would have had two inspections per year from that 398 
retailer. These would be additional inspections to the F and O inspection. The retailer 399 
schemes in GB are not externally auditable; membership of retailer schemes was 400 
identified by stakeholders as a possible correlate to identify farmers more compliant with 401 
legislation and code because these schemes are positively marketed by retailers as 402 
indicative of good welfare.   Ultimately only one retailer participated in the study; the 403 
others did not reply to emails or telephone calls after 14 days. The reason for not 404 
participating is not known.  405 
 406 
The lack of association between non-welfare animal-related SMRs and GAECs and 407 
compliance at APHA inspections might indicate that attention to detail 408 
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(conscientiousness of farmers) to comply with non-welfare related regulations is not 409 
linked to greater compliance with welfare legislation.  However, over 50% of matched 410 
records had a non-compliance with an SMR or GAEC, this high percentage might make 411 
these data too sensitive and insufficiently specific an association with compliance with 412 
animal welfare where the average annual non-compliance was <20%.  413 
 414 
From 2008 the types of inspections to farms between claimants of government payments 415 
and non-claimants has differed. Whilst inspection type and other variables, e.g. number 416 
of animals inspected, were included in the model it is likely that other factors that 417 
distinguish claimant and non-claimant farms are present and so this variable might act as 418 
a marker for different farm types rather than different welfare standards.  419 
 420 
The results from participating schemes indicate that, if membership changes behaviour, 421 
there is potential for private regulation, e.g. licensing of farms, to improve animal welfare 422 
(Albersmeier et al 2009). Private regulation and regular inspection of all farms is unlikely 423 
to reduce the burden on APHA to inspect some farms each year because there will always 424 
be a need for inspection from a government body; some farms in schemes still fail APHA 425 
welfare inspections (Tables 2 and 3), however, targeting of high-risk farms can be further 426 
improved using the new results from the current analysis (Table 3). To ensure that the 427 
national average level of compliance with animal welfare legislation and code is known, 428 
random visits to benchmark compliance with welfare legislation is still needed; indeed it 429 
is vital information to benchmark GB and assess whether welfare standards are 430 
improving generally.  431 
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 432 
Animal welfare implications 433 
The study demonstrates that compliance with GB on-farm welfare regulations is greater 434 
for farmers who are members of farm assurance (including one retailer), organic 435 
certification or herd health schemes compared with farmers not known to be in a scheme; 436 
and greater when farms are in more than one scheme. Whilst market forces, ethos and 437 
farm management might contribute to compliance, the participating schemes have clear 438 
guidelines and farms are inspected regularly at approximately one–year intervals and 439 
these facts might incentivise farmers to remain compliant. This raises two hypotheses; 440 
one: that voluntary membership of private schemes is improving animal welfare and 441 
should be further encouraged or; the alternative hypothesis: that licensing of all livestock 442 
farms with private regulation and annual independent inspection might raise compliance 443 
with welfare legislation and code. Given the small number of farms that can be inspected 444 
by APHA each year exploration of both hypotheses would be useful to raise the welfare 445 
of livestock in GB. We conclude that the current risk based model for APHA can be 446 
improved further by adding membership of herd health schemes and membership of 447 
multiple schemes.  448 
 449 
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